We study the role of labor market mismatch in the adjustment to a trade liberalization that results in the o¤shoring of high-tech production. Our model features twosided heterogeneity in the labor market: high-and low-skilled workers are matched in a frictional labor market with high-and low-tech …rms. Mismatch employment occurs when high-skilled workers choose to accept a less desirable job in the low-tech industry.
Introduction
Improvements in transportation, information, and communication technologies over the past 30 years have led to greater internationalization of production processes. A key component of this aspect of globalization has been an increase in the willingness of …rms to o¤shore-that is, to hire foreign workers to do jobs that were previously done domestically. 1 One consequence of the increase in o¤shoring has been a backlash in public opinion regarding whether or not this trend is desirable. Indeed, o¤shoring-and, in particular, its impact on the labor market-is a controversial topic. The problem is all the more acute when we consider that the e¤ects of o¤shoring may run beyond actual observed o¤shoring. Blinder (2009) makes the point that while actual o¤shoring may have an important e¤ect on wages and employment, the mere fact that certain jobs have characteristics that make them susceptible to o¤shoring may also be an important driver of labor market outcomes.
There is a wide body of empirical evidence on the impact of o¤shoring on the labor market. 2 However, it is di¢ cult to extract a consistent theme at the aggregate level primarily because the wage and labor market e¤ects tend to di¤er greatly depending on what speci…c notion of o¤shoring is being considered and on the degree of disaggregation of the data being studied. Indeed, no clear consensus emerges from these papers regarding whether or not a strong backlash against o¤shoring is, in fact, justi…ed.
One relatively underdeveloped area of the literature concerns the role of trade and job dislocation, or the idea that high-skilled workers are forced into taking low-paying jobs.
Earlier work by Jacobson, Lalond, and Sullivan (1993) and Kletzer (2001) suggests that job dislocation has an important role in the adjustment to globalization. More recently, work by Hummels, Munch, and Xiang (2011) uses Danish micro-level data to show that the adjustment costs for workers displaced due to o¤shoring tend to be higher than the 1 The trend toward increased o¤shoring and more signi…cant foreign involvement by multinational enterprises more generally is documented in Crino (2009), for example. 2 For example, early work by Feenstra and Hanson (1996 , 1997 ) focuses on manufacturing o¤shoring, while Amiti and Wei (2005) and Gorg and Hansely (2005) focus on the rapid growth in services o¤shoring. These papers center primarily at the industry level. Taking yet a di¤erent approach, both Liu and Tre ‡er (2008) and Ebenstein et al. (2011) try to measure the impact of o¤shoring using disaggregated data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). In still a di¤erent direction, Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2011) examine the link between o¤shoring and changes in the occupational structure of employment. adjustment costs for workers displaced for other reasons.
In this paper, we try to better understand the link between job dislocation and o¤shoring using a theoretical approach. Our analysis builds on Davidson The model consists of two countries, called the North and South, each of which is endowed with a labor force composed of both high-and low-skill individuals. The latter are only quali…ed for low-tech jobs, while the former are quali…ed for both high-and low-tech jobs. 3 Upon entry into a market ex ante identical …rms make an irreversible investment decision to adapt one of two possible technologies: low-or high-tech production. Free entry into vacancy posting is such that both high-and low-tech …rms can exist within any given country. In order to produce, …rms match with workers in a labor market that is characterized by search frictions as in Diamond (1982) , Mortensen (1982) , and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) .
Given the di¤erent employment opportunities available to high-skill workers, two types of equilibrium con…gurations are possible. In an ex-post segmented (EPS) equilibrium highskilled workers only accept high-tech jobs. Alternatively, under certain conditions a crossskill matching (CSM) equilibrium-that is, one in which high-skilled workers are willing to accept both high-and low-tech (mismatch) jobs-can arise.
We make two improvements relative to the original model used in DMS. First, a key limitation of the DMS setup is that there are no explicit international production linkages.
Our paper improves on this by introducing a richer production structure. Speci…cally, we assume that in the North there exists a multinational …rm that produces output using a ‡exibly parameterized constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregator of domestic and foreign (o¤shored) high-tech inputs. The second improvement is that our analysis is carried out in a version of the model that is carefully calibrated using data from both the U.S. and emerging market economies.
The paper has two main results. First, we show that mismatch employment helps mitigate adverse labor market consequences that arise as a result of o¤shoring. We show this by …rst qualitatively reproducing the results in DMS under which a trade liberalization triggers a switch from EPS to CSM equilibrium. We then isolate the e¤ect of mismatch by forcing the economy from a post-liberalization CSM equilibrium (with mismatch) to a postliberalization EPS equilibrium (without mismatch). The di¤erence in allocations across the two post-liberalization outcomes reveal that by allowing domestic high-skilled labor to reallocate across both the remaining high-and low-tech industries, mismatch helps to dampen both the increase in the unemployment rate and the decline in wages that result from shifting domestic production abroad. This …nding is essentially an open economy extension of Albrecht and Vroman's (2002) result on the impact of skill-biased technological change in a closed economy setting. From a policy perspective, it suggests that some degree of mismatch is actually desirable from an aggregate perspective because it helps facilitate adjustment in the labor market following a trade liberalization.
The second result is more technical in nature. We show that under our calibration the size of the parameter space over which it is possible for mismatch to emerge as an equilibrium outcome is limited. In particular, as long as the size of the high-tech o¤shoring sector remains relatively small-which appears to be the most empirically relevant casehighly-skilled workers will only choose to enter into mismatch employment if domestic and foreign inputs are su¢ ciently complementary in the multinational's production function. If the two inputs are instead viewed as substitutes, the calibrated economy lies in a part of the parameter space where mismatch does not arise in a post-liberalization equilibrium.
In terms of related literature, beyond the empirical papers cited above, there is a large The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model in Section 2. Section 3 discusses our calibration strategy, and the main results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 addresses the sensitivity of our results to alternative parameterizations of the multinational's production function. Finally, Section 6 o¤ers some concluding comments.
The Model
The world economy consists of two countries that we refer to as the North and the South.
Each economy is inhabited by both high-and low-skilled workers, and there is no international migration. In addition, in each economy there is a …nal-output producing …rm that 4 This can also be interpreted as random search, since the assumption of an aggregate meeting function is such that individuals searching for employment may encounter job opportunities that they are unwilling or unquali…ed to take. Alternatively, in the present context directed search would involve sectoral highand low-tech meeting functions that take as inputs sector-speci…c vacancies and searchers instead of their aggregate counterparts. The existence of such sectoral meeting functions imply that workers are indeed able to only search for jobs that they are quali…ed for and are actually willing to take. See Epstein (2012) and Arseneau and Epstein (2014a) for more on this topic.
The labor market is structured such that low-skill workers in either economy are only quali…ed for employment in jobs operated by the corresponding domestic low-tech intermediate producers. In contrast, high-skilled workers are in principle able to attain employment in either the high-tech multinational-via high-skilled workers in the North employed by high- 
The Northern Economy
The Northern economy is inhabited by a population of in…nitely lived individuals with unit mass, all of whom always participate in the labor market. A fraction 2 (0,1) of the Northern labor force consists of low-skilled workers (L). The remaining 1 fraction of the labor force consists of high-skilled workers (H). 
Production
Final output produced using low- 
Since each intermediate producer has only one job, then 5 In the absence of trade, = 1. Note that the multinational production function establishes explicit international linkages between countries, which is an innovation of our modeling approach relative to DMS, where no explicit international linkages were considered.
The pro…t-maximization problem of the multinational is
where: p H is the price of high-tech Northern intermediate inputs; and p O is the price of o¤shore inputs. The …rst-order conditions imply that
and 
Value Functions
Intermediate Producers For i; j 2 fL,Hg and i = j the value to a Northern intermediate producer of type i from employing a type-j worker J i satis…es
where: r is the interest rate in the Northern economy; c is the Northern …xed ‡ow cost of posting a vacancy and maintaining a job; y j is the value of output of a match as de…ned earlier; w i is the Nash bargained wage; is the exogenous economy-wide rate of job destruction in the North; and V i is the value of an un…lled vacancy posted by a Northern type-i intermediate producer. The value of mismatch employment for a low-tech …rm J M is the same as the expression above but with i = M and j = L. Intuitively, the …rm's value from a …lled position is equal to a worker's marginal value of production in that job net of the wage, the job-maintenance cost, and the expected capital loss owing to job destruction.
Given the meeting process described above, for i 2 fL,Hg the value of a vacancy for a type-i …rm V i satis…es
where: I L is an indicator function whose value is equal to 1 with i = L in CSM equilibrium, while it takes a value of zero in the event that i = H or in EPS equilibrium if i = L.
Workers For i; j 2 fL,Hg and i = j the value to a Northern worker of type i from being employed by a type-j …rm W i satis…es
This equation says that the corresponding employment ‡ow value to a worker is equal to the wage paid in the position net of the expected capital loss owing to job destruction. The value of mismatch employment for a high-skill worker W M is the same as the expression above but with j = M and i = H.
For i 2 fL,Hg the value of unemployment for a Northern type-i worker U i satis…es
where: I H is an indicator function whose value is equal to 1 with i = H in CSM equilibrium, while it takes a value of zero if i = L or in EPS equilibrium if i = H. It follows that unemployment ‡ow values are equal to the sum of unemployment ‡ow bene…ts and the expected capital gains from becoming employed.
Surpluses
The surplus of a match is equal to the sum of the capital gains that …rms and workers obtain from forming an employment relationship. Thus, for i; j; k 2 fL; Hg and i = j = k match surpluses from high-skill workers matched with high-tech jobs and low-skill workers matched with low-tech jobs are given by 
Wages
Let 2 (0,1) denote workers' exogenously determined constant bargaining power. Nash bargaining of wages without commitment to the future path of wages (that is, wages can be instantaneously renegotiated given changes in the economic environment) implies a surplus sharing rule by which a worker's capital gain from becoming employed is a constant fraction of the associated surplus, and similarly a …rm's capital gain derived from forming an employment relationship is a constant fraction 1 of the associated surplus. Thus, Nash bargaining implies that for i,j,k 2 fL,Hg and i = j = k the wage w i is implicitly de…ned by
In turn, the mismatch wage satis…es the equation above with j = M , k = H, and i = L.
Also, note that the average wage of low-skill workers w L is simply equal to w L , while the average wage of high-skill workers w H , is
Finally, the Northern aggregate wage W is given by
Flow Equilibrium Conditions
Three equilibrium ‡ow conditions must be accounted for, de…ning: 1) the mass of unemployed low-skilled individuals; 2) the mass of unemployed high-skill individuals; and 3) the mass of mismatched individuals. Since all employment relationships end at exogenous rate and low-skill individuals exit unemployment at e¤ective rate f L , it follows that in equilibrium the mass of low-skill unemployed individuals satis…es
Using similar reasoning, the equilibrium mass of unemployed high-skilled individuals satis…es
Furthermore, high-skill workers become mismatch employed at e¤ective rate I H f L . therefore, the equilibrium mass of high-skilled workers employed by low-tech …rms satis…es
Of course, the total number of individuals employed by high-tech …rms is
and the total number of low-skilled individuals employed by low-tech …rms is
Note that the unemployment rate of low-skill workers is u L = , and similarly that of highskill workers is u H =(1 ). Moreover, the rate of mismatch employment to total high-skill employment is e M =(1 u H ).
The Southern Economy
Recall that, following DMS, we assume that while the Southern labor force consists of both 
where: c O is a …xed ‡ow cost speci…cally associated with maintaining an o¤shore job and posting o¤shore vacancies. It follows that the value of an o¤shore vacancy V O satis…es
(note that in an equilibrium with trade total vacancies in the South v are equal to the sum of Southern low-tech vacancies v L and o¤shore vacancies v O ; in addition, the fraction of low-tech vacancies is L , and the fraction of o¤shore vacancies is O = 1 L ). Fourth, in similar spirit to DMS, we assume that autarky is consistent with the value of c O being prohibitively high. However, a decline in c O to a su¢ ciently small value is consistent with the world economy moving to an equilibrium with trade (for simplicity, we assume that trade is associated with the value of c O having e¤ectively dropped to zero, therefore inducing entry into the o¤shore market).
Equilibrium
Following DMS, our baseline world equilibrium assumptions are that: 1) under autarky the North is in EPS equilibrium (while the South is trivially in CSM equilibrium); 2) under trade high-skilled workers in the North become su¢ ciently pessimistic about their future job market prospects triggering a switch to CSM equilibrium; 3) for simplicity, under trade the wages associated with o¤shore employment are perceived by Southern high-skill workers as being su¢ ciently high that they stop accepting low-tech jobs, triggering a switch to EPS equilibrium. Unlike DMS, we later assess the impact of mismatch in the North by considering an alternative trade equilibrium in which both the North and the South are in EPS equilibrium. Moreover, we discuss why in autarky a CSM equilibrium in the North would not emerge under our baseline calibration.
For expositional brevity, in the remainder of this section whenever possible we focus the discussion on the Northern economy. Analogous considerations to those presented, when applicable, are straightforward for the South.
In line with related literature, we assume free entry into vacancy posting. This assumption implies that the value of a vacancy for any intermediate producer is equal to zero. 1) is the elasticity of matches with respect to aggregate vacancies. Let = v=u denote market tightness. It follows that the rate at which workers meet …rms can be stated as f = A , which is increasing in market tightness, and the rate at which …rms meet workers is q = A 1 , which is decreasing in market tightness. The preceding, along with the surplus de…nitions and Nash bargaining surplus-sharing rules, implies that key equilibrium conditions can be stated in terms of market tightness (rather than aggregate vacancies and aggregate unemployment) and also in terms of surpluses (rather than agent-speci…c value functions).
Preliminaries
Existence For EPS equilibrium to exist, it must be the case that the surplus from a match between a low-skilled worker and a low-tech intermediate …rm is positive and that the surplus from a match between a high-skill worker and a high-tech intermediate …rm is positive as well. Solving explicitly for surpluses in EPS equilibrium (which is straightforward given the de…nition of surplus from earlier as well as relevant value function statements) it follows that y L > c+b and y H > c+b are necessary and su¢ cient conditions for, respectively, S L > 0 and
For CSM equilibrium to be viable it must be the case that: S L > 0; S H 0; and the surplus from a match between a high-skilled worker and a low-tech intermediate …rm 
That is, the di¤erence between the surplus from a match between a high-skilled worker and a high-tech …rm and the surplus from mismatch is simply equal to a weighted di¤erence of the value of output between these matches. Now, rearranging the surplus S M and substituting in equation (9) yields
Therefore, S M is positive if and only if
It follows from equation ( Note that, all else equal, the smaller the di¤erence between y M and y H is, as well as the smaller H is, the more likely it is that inequality (10) is indeed satis…ed. Intuitively, as H ! 0 high-tech jobs become increasingly scarce, and in the limit they are entirely unavailable meaning that high-skill workers'outside (high-tech) employment options do not weigh on mismatch surplus. An analogous interpretation follows from considering the case in which y M ! y H .
As noted earlier, EPS and CSM equilibrium con…gurations are not mutually exclusive.
Indeed, as long as y L > c+b and y H > c+b, then EPS equilibrium always exists. Should the preceding hold and the economy's parameters be such that CSM equilibrium also exists, then as noted in DMS whether the economy settles on EPS or CSM equilibrium can depend on many factors, including, for instance, high-skill workers' expectations about high-tech employment prospects.
Vacancy Creation Conditions Rearrangement of the Northern vacancy ‡ow value equations along with free-entry into vacancy-posting and the de…nition of surplus and Nash bargaining imply for i 2 fL,Hg the following Northern vacancy-creation condition:
These equations hold when the value of a particular type of job to a …rm is positive, and simply say that given free-entry into vacancy creation the expected gains from posting lowor high-tech vacancies (the left-hand side) are equal to the expected costs (the right-hand side). In the South, similar reasoning applies leading for i 2 fL,Og to the following Southern vacancy-creation condition:
where: I O is an indicator function equal to 0 if i = L and the Southern economy is in autarky and equal to 1 if o¤shoring occurs and i = O or i = L.
De…nitions
Given the development thus far, in all de…nitions that follow knowledge of the fundamental vectors S and V is su¢ cient to solve for any other endogenous variables and equilibrium ‡ow equations of interest. 
1. The following are solved: the two corresponding Northern surplus equations implied by equation (5) and the two analogous surplus equations for the South, the two corresponding Northern vacancy-creation condition equations implied by equation (11), the single corresponding vacancy-creation condition for the South implied by equation (12) , the two Northern price equations (1) and (3) with = 1 and the single analogous (low-tech) price equation for the South, equations (6), (7) and the two analogous unemployment equations for the South, and also the single Southern equation de…ning mismatch employment analogous to its Northern counterpart (equation (8)).
S
Definition 2: trade equilibrium with both the North and South in EPS con…gurations.
A steady-state trade equilibrium with ex-post segmentation in both the North and South consists of a set of value functions
1. The following are solved: the two corresponding Northern surplus equations implied by equation ( 
S L >, S
1. The following are solved: the three corresponding Northern surplus equations implied by equation ( 
S
In light of the preceding de…nitions, the de…nition of an autarky equilibrium with both the North and South in CSM con…gurations is straightforward.
Calibration
The baseline calibration is summarized in Table 1 and assumes a trade equilibrium with the North in CSM con…guration and the South in EPS con…guration (this is consistent with equilibrium De…nition 3 above). The frequency is monthly, so the interest rates are set to r = r = 0:004, which is consistent with an annual interest rate of 5 percent.
Northern Economy
As in Arseneau and Epstein (2014a), we assume that individuals with at least some postsecondary education are high-skill workers while those with at most a high school degree correspond to low-skill workers. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data shows that about half of the U.S. population has at most a high school degree. Therefore, we set the fraction of low-skilled individuals in the Northern economy to = 0:5.
As noted earlier, the job market is characterized by a standard Cobb-Douglas matching function. We set the elasticity of the matching function with respect to aggregate vacancies to 0:5, which is broadly in line with research surveyed in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
The matching e¢ ciency parameter A is calibrated as follows. Using aggregate monthly data on unemployment since 1951 that is available publicly from the BLS along with the methodology in Elsby, Michaels, and Solon (2009) and Shimer (2012), we …nd that in the U.S. the probability that an average unemployed individual …nds a job within a month is 0:43: Given this …gure, assuming an underlying Poisson distribution implies that the rate at which an average unemployed individual …nds a job is 0:56. Therefore, the matching e¢ ciency parameter is used to attain the steady state value of
The exogenous job destruction probability is calibrated using data on aggregate unemployment from the BLS. These data show that since 1951 the average US unemployment rate is 0:058. Therefore, we pin down the job destruction rate by targeting the steady-state value u = 0:058. In turn, the cost of posting vacancies c is used to target the ratio of aggre- Finally, the analysis in Sicherman (1991) suggests that each year of overeducation relative to a job's educational requirements induces an overeducation wage premium of nearly 4 percent relative to individuals with the required amount of education. Given that our reference for the model's high-skill workers are individuals with at least some post-secondary education-which can include attaining a college degree and higher-we use the mismatch productivity parameter z M to target a conservative wage ratio of w M =w L = 1:135.
Southern Economy
Our Southern country is meant to be a representative emerging market economy. In par- …nding rate for Mexico of 0:11. Thus, akin to the Northern economy we choose A so that
The exogenous job destruction probability is calibrated using data on aggregate unemployment rates from statistical agencies of nearly all our reference emerging economies.
Taken at face value, these data suggest an average unemployment rate across emerging economies of about 10 percent. Therefore, we pin down the job destruction rate by targeting the steady-state value u = 0:1. In turn, the cost of posting vacancies c is used to target the ratio of aggregate vacancies to aggregate unemployment: v =u = 0:2. We obtain this …gure by taking at face value data on aggregate job openings from several emerging market statistical agencies. 6 In addition, recall that under trade we assume that the o¤shore-speci…c ‡ow cost is c O = 0.
As in the Northern economy, we assume symmetry in bargaining power so that = 0:5.
Many emerging market economies have no formal unemployment insurance scheme, which would argue for setting b = 0. Nevertheless, we take the midpoint between that lower bound and the replacement rate in the North and choose instead to set b = 0:2
Turning towards production, we normalize z L = 1. In addition, we follow DMS and assume that the value of Southern low-tech intermediate production is about 40 percent of that of Northern high-tech intermediate production, which pins downs the technology parameter Z L .
Finally, we pin down the multinational's substitutability parameter by assuming a wage ratio w O =w L = 1:3. This wage ratio is higher than its counterpart in the North in the spirit of the assumption that Southern high-tech workers …nd o¤shore wages su¢ ciently high that EPS con…guration emerges under trade. As noted in Table 1 , the resulting value of implies strong complementarity (the baseline calibration is such that for any target w O =w L > 1 a negative value for always emerges).
Quantitative Results
As noted earlier, our baseline exercise involves assessing the impact of a trade liberalization by comparing the benchmark trade equilibrium to an autarky equilibrium in which the North is in EPS con…guration and the South is trivially in CSM con…guration. When implementing the trade liberalization, we assume that all country-speci…c parameters remain as in the benchmark trade equilibrium. In addition, when the South moves to a post-liberalization CSM equilibrium we assume a mismatch wage premium of 13:5 percent (as was the case for the North in CSM equilibrium). This assumption pins down a value for the Southern mismatch productivity parameter z M = 1:03.
We choose to compare the benchmark trade equilibrium to an autarky EPS equilibrium in the North for two reasons. First, doing so allows our results to be more directly comparable to those reported previously in DMS, who, as noted earlier, analyze a trade liberalization under the assumption that high-skilled workers in the Northern economy become su¢ ciently pessimistic about their future job market prospects such that it induces a shift from EPS to CSM equilibrium. Second-and most importantly-an autarky equilibrium in which the North is in CSM does not exist under our baseline parameterization. This is because our calibration, which is informed by observable data on both U.S. and emerging economy labor markets, implies that under autarky the value of Northern intermediate high-tech production is so much higher than the value of Northern intermediate low-tech production that the mismatch surplus is driven below zero. Hence, mismatch is not supported in the autarky equilibrium under the baseline calibration.
Main Results
The baseline results are presented in Table 2 From the perspective of job creation in the low-tech sector, mismatch generates two opposing e¤ects. On the one hand, because Northern low-tech …rms now expect to form matches with high-skill workers-whose wages are higher than those of low-skill workers because of their higher productivity and higher outside option (employment in high-tech …rms)-the expected gains from posting a low-tech vacancy are reduced. However, this e¤ect is partially o¤set by the fact that low-tech …rms encounter suitable job candidates faster as a result of high-skilled participation in the market for low-tech jobs. All told, lowtech vacancies decline, but by less than high-tech vacancies, making the share of low-tech vacancies in the total vacancy pool, L , rise. Since low-skilled workers …nd jobs at e¤ective rate L f; the unemployment rate for low-skilled workers declines nearly twice as much as the unemployment rate for high-skilled workers. Moreover, given their higher job-…nding prospects, wages for low-skilled workers increase modestly as …rms must compensate them for their higher outside option.
All told, these results suggest that a trade liberalization that results in increased o¤-shoring of high-skilled labor generates clear distributional e¤ects in the Northern economy.
It ‡attens the wage distribution as wages in the high-tech sector fall sharply while wages in the low-tech sector increase modestly. 7 Unemployment is lower across the board, but the impact is greater for low-skilled individuals.
In the Southern economy, the shift from autarky to trade results in an increase in both the aggregate wage and aggregate unemployment. Since higher-skilled workers are now only willing to accept o¤shore (high-tech) jobs, low-tech …rms in the Southern economy encounter suitable workers less frequently, which raises expected vacancy-posting costs. Consequently, low-tech vacancies v L decline resulting in a substantial increase in the low-skill unemployment rate, u L = and a decline in the Southern low-tech wage w L . In turn, the combination of Southern higher-skilled workers only being willing to accept o¤shore jobs in conjunction with the limited o¤shore vacancies posted by the multinational is such that the unemployment rate of higher-skilled Southern workers u H =(1 ) rises. However, since the value of o¤shore production is substantially higher than that of low-tech …rms, the average wage of high-skilled workers under trade w H is much higher than their autarky wage.
The Role of Mismatch
We conduct a simple experiment that allows us to parse out the direct role of mismatch in the adjustment of the Northern labor market to increased o¤shoring: Panel C of Table 2 Intuitively, the bene…t of mismatch comes from the fact that it allows for sectoral reallocation of the labor market following a large shock. In other words, mismatch opens up a number of additional employment opportunities for high-skilled individuals that would otherwise evaporate following the increase in o¤shoring. As high-skilled individuals take advantage of these opportunities, labor market activity shifts across sectors in a way that cushions the decline in wages and ultimately decreases unemployment. In absence of the ability to engage in this sectoral reallocation, the Northern labor market is fully exposed to the o¤shoring shock because the low-and high-tech labor markets are e¤ectively segmented.
The role of mismatch in adjusting to trade liberalization in our model echoes earlier results by Albrecht and Vroman (2002) who examine the response to skill biased technological change in a closed economy setting. This may not be surprising as an o¤shoring shock can be thought of as a form of skill biased technological change in the sense that the reduction in trade costs changes the production frontier of the multinational by making o¤shoring possible.
Sensitivity Analysis
We conduct two sets of sensitivity analyses. The …rst focuses on how the characteristics of the multinational's production function shape the response of the labor market to an increase in o¤shoring. The second set focuses on the size of the parameter space that supports mismatch as an equilibrium outcome.
The Multinational' s Production Function
By introducing a …nal goods producing …rm that uses a ‡exibly parameterized CES aggregator, our model allows international linkages to play a wide role in shaping results. We examine the sensitivity of labor market outcomes to the size of the o¤shore sector and to the complementarity versus substitutability of Northern and Southern inputs in the multinational's production function. Similarly, the upper and lower panels in the right column show that when the economy remains in EPS equilibrium, the unemployment rate rises rather than falls, and wages decline even more sharply. Overall, these results are qualitatively similar to the baseline results and suggest that the equilibrium shift, rather than the speci…c parameterization of the production function, is much more important in determining the response of the labor market. Figure 2 conducts a similar exercise as in Figure 1 , but now we vary the complementarity versus substitutability of Northern and Southern inputs in the multinational's production function, only. Compared to the case in which we varied , changes in yield a story that is a bit di¤erent. The panels in Figure 2 show that the baseline results are robust provided Northern and Southern inputs are su¢ ciently complimentary (i.e., is su¢ ciently negative). But, as the two become more substitutable the e¤ect on the labor market-and, in particular, unemployment-is quite di¤erent. For example, when the increase in o¤shoring induces a shift from EPS to CSM equilibrium, the upper left panel shows that this change drives an increase in low-skilled unemployment for low levels of complementarity. It is also interesting to note that the parameter space over which CSM equilibrium is supported does not exist for values of above 4:4 (the shaded region in the …gure's two panels). In the next subsection we investigate this existence aspect of the model more closely. The shift from EPS equilibrium in autarky to CSM trade equilibrium shows that when Northern and Southern labor are substitutable, there is a minimal impact of unemployment and the adverse e¤ect of the high-tech wage is notably dampened.
How General a Result is Equilibrium Mismatch?
Our main results illustrate the importance of whether or not mismatch is a feature of the post-liberalization equilibrium for how the labor market adjusts to o¤shoring. Implicit is the fact that in our baseline parameterization both EPS (no mismatch) and CSM (mismatch) equilibrium are feasible. How general a result is the coexistence of both types of equilibria under trade? What is interesting about Figure 3 is that an empirically relevant parameterization is one in which the share of o¤shored production is relatively small, so that 0:9 < 1 (see, for instance, Burstein, Kurtz, and Tesar (2008) and Arseneau and Leduc (2012) ). Within that range, mismatch only exists as an equilibrium outcome when domestic and foreign high-skilled inputs are su¢ ciently complementary. While our parameterization of satis…es this criteria, there is considerable uncertainty regarding whether o¤shored production should be viewed as a complement to or a substitute for domestic inputs. Figure 1 suggests that if one believes the inputs are substitutes (or mild complements with a su¢ ciently low share of o¤shore activity), the labor market implications of o¤shoring could be much larger because mismatch will not arise to help cushion the labor market e¤ects following a trade liberalization.
Conclusion
We study the role of mismatch in the adjustment of the labor market to a trade liberalization that results in o¤shoring of high-tech production. Our results suggest that mismatch helps to mitigate the negative labor market consequences that arise from o¤shoring. The ability to reallocate domestic high-skilled labor across both high-and low-tech industries dampens the increase in the unemployment rate as well as the decline in wages that result from shifting domestic production abroad. Our analysis also reveals that under our calibration the size of the parameter space over which mismatch can arise as an equilibrium outcome is, in fact, quite limited. Indeed, as long as the share of the o¤shored production is not too large, highskilled workers will only choose to accept jobs with low-tech …rms if domestic and o¤shore high-tech production are su¢ ciently complementary.
In general, we view the limited subset of the parameters space in which mismatch can arise as an equilibrium outcome as a limitation of the model presented in this paper. in order to bring a calibrated version of the model more in line with observed data, the model needs to be extended in a way that makes mismatch a more attractive proposition to both workers and …rms following trade reform. We pursue two such extensions in companion work. Arseneau and Epstein (2014b) introduces on-the-job search to the partial equilibrium framework presented here, while Arseneau and Epstein (2014c) extends this modeling framework to a general equilibrium open economy setting with endogenous directed search. 
